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TRANSITIONAL DISCRIMINATION
by ELIZABETH M. GLAZER*
ZACHARY A. KRAMER"
INTRODUCTION
Meet Diane Schroer:

1

Schroer is a graduate of both the National War College and the Army
Command and General Staff College and she holds masters degrees
in history and international relations. During Schroer's twenty-five
years of service in the U.S. Armed Forces, she held important
command and staff positions in the Armored Calvary [sic], Airborne,
Special Forces and Special Operations Units, and in combat
operations in Haiti and Rwanda. Before her retirement from the
military in January 2004, Schroer was a Colonel assigned to the U.S.
Special Operations Command, serving as the director of a 120person classified organization that tracked and targeted high-threat
In this position, Colonel
international terrorist organizations.
Schroer analyzed sensitive intelligence reports, planned a range of
classified and conventional operations, and regularly briefed senior
military and government officials, including the Vice President, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
At the time of her military retirement, Schroer held a Top Secret,
Sensitive Compartmented Information security clearance, and had
done so on a continuous basis since 1987. After her retirement,
Schroer joined a private consulting firm, Benchmark International,
where ... she [worked] as a program manager on an infrastructure
security project for the National Guard. Diane Schroer was qualified
for a position as the Specialist in Terrorism and International Crime
with the Congressional Research Service ("CRS") at the Library of
Congress, a position for which Schroer 2applied in August 2004,
while working at Benchmark International.

Associate Professor, Hofstra University School of Law.
Assistant Professor of Law, Penn State University.
This Essay was an invited contribution to the Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review's 2008
symposium, Intersections of Transgender Lives and the Law: Critical Perspectives on Legal and Social
Challenges. We wish to thank Natalie Hrubos for inviting our participation in this Symposium issue. In
addition, we wish to thank participants at the Touro Journalof Race, Gender, and Ethnicity Symposium
on transgender rights and Leandra Lederman for helpful comments on this Essay.
1. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295 (D.D.C. 2008).
2. Id. at 295.
[651]
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Despite Schroer's stellar credentials, CRS rescinded Schroer's job offer.3
CRS's decision not to hire Schroer was not because she was not qualified for the
job, which she was. 4 The decision was not made because Schroer did not receive
"the highest interview score of all eighteen candidates" that CRS interviewed for
the position, which Schroer did. 5 The decision also had nothing to do with the fact
that after receiving several writing samples and a list of references from Schroer,
"the members of CRS's selection committee unanimously recommended that
Schroer be offered the job," which the committee did.6 Instead, CRS's decision not
to hire Diane Schroer was made because Schroer was transitioning from male to
female.7
Diane Schroer is not the first transgender8 plaintiff to win an employment
discrimination claim under Title VII. 9 For instance, Jimmie Smith, 0 a transgender
firefighter from Salem, Ohio, and Phelicia Barnes," a transgender police officer in
Cincinnati, Ohio, both won discrimination claims in recent years. Smith and
Barnes won their cases by framing their discrimination claims in terms of their
gender-nonconformity, with both alleging that they were discriminated against for
being effeminate men.' 2 Although Jimmie Smith and Phelicia Barnes paved the
way for Diane Schroer to win her case, Schroer was able to accomplish something
that no other transgender plaintiff has ever done before. What distinguishes Diane
Schroer from plaintiffs like Smith and Barnes is that Diane Schroer convinced the
courts that she was entitled to protection for being discriminated against in her
capacity as a transgender person. 3

3. Id. at 299.
4. Id. at 297 n.l.
5. Id.
at 296.
6. Id.
7. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 299 (citing a proposed draft of the selecting official's email to
Schroer, rescinding the job offer).
8. Because the term "transgender" has been observed to "simultaneously encompass various
definitions," we should pause here to define what we mean by it. Ming-Yu Bob Kau, Transgender
Rights edited by Paisley Currah,Richard M Juang,and Shannon PriceMinter, Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 2006, 368 pp. $19.95 paper, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 274, 274 (2007)
(book review). We borrow a broad and inclusive definition of the term from Professor Anna Kirkland,
who has defined transgender to include "gender variant people who have not necessarily sought to alter
their bodies but nonetheless feel a disjunction between their biologically and socially gendered selves."
Anna Kirkland, Victorious Transsexuals in the Courtroom: A Challengefor Feminist Legal Theory, 28
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 2 (2003). This term is considered broader than, and to include within its
definition, the term "transsexual," which "refer[s] to people who identify as [transsexual] and who seek
to alter their physiological gender status through surgery or hormones in order to bring it into line with
their social and emotional gender status."
9. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-17) (providing in § 2000e-2, known as Title VII, that "[i]t shall be an unlawful practice
for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin").
10. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (transgender plaintiff Jimmie Smith).
11. Barnes v. Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005) (transgender plaintiff Phelicia Barnes).
12. See generally Smith, 378 F.3d 566.
13. Compare Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (holding that Title VII prohibits discrimination based
on an individual's transgender status), with Smith, 378 F.3d at 578 (holding that the plaintiff's

Spring 2009]

TRANSITIONAL DISCRIMINATION

In reaching the conclusion that Diane Schroer was discriminated against in
4
violation of Title VII, the Schroer v. Billington court analogized the
discrimination that she suffered to the discrimination suffered by a religious
convert. 5 In the same way that discriminating against an employee who had
converted from Christianity to Judaism would constitute discrimination "because of
religion" in violation of Title VII, so, too, reasoned the Schroer court,
discrimination against an employee who had transitioned from male to female
6
would constitute discrimination "because of sex" in violation of Title VII.' In so
doing, the court conceptualized Schroer's identity by focusing on its transitional
While transgender employees before Diane Schroer have won
state.I7
discrimination lawsuits against their employers, their victories have not offered a
stable basis for protecting against transgender discrimination. As a result, as we
highlight in other work, transgender individuals who have been discriminated
8
against cannot rely on the law's protection from discrimination.
Transgenderism is in transition. We mean this in both a narrow and a broad
sense. In a narrow sense, a transgender person's identity often is literally in
transition, as a person transitions from one sex or gender to another. And in a
broader sense, the transgender rights movement is also in transition, particularly
with respect to the ways in which transgender plaintiffs are framing their
discrimination claims. Although the recent decision in Schroer offers transgender
plaintiffs hopeful precedent, it is unclear whether other courts will rule the same
19
way in cases of transgender discrimination. This Essay argues that in order to
ensure more consistent results in cases of transgender discrimination, courts should
embrace an understanding of transitional identity.
Transitional identity is identity that has aspects of one or more extant
identities, but which is inchoate, in that the identity does not express fully any of

allegations sufficiently constituted a claim of sex discrimination rooted in the Equal Protection Clause
and pursuant to Title VII), and Barnes, 401 F.3d at 739 (finding that plaintiff was a member of the
protected class, as a man or a woman, and thus has standing to bring a Title VII claim).
14. 577 F. Supp. 2d 293.
15. Id. at 306-07.
16. See id. ("No court would take seriously the notion that 'converts' are not covered by the statute.
Discrimination 'because of religion' easily encompasses discrimination because of a change of religion.
But in cases where the plaintiff has changed her sex, and faces discrimination because of the decision to
stop presenting as a man and to start appearing as a woman, courts have traditionally carved such
persons out of the statute by concluding that 'transsexuality' is unprotected by Title VII.").
17. See id. (analogizing change in religion to change in gender to emphasize the transitional state).
18. See Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, Trans Fat, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming
=
2010) (available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 1337129) (reviewing ANNA
KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD

(2008)) (arguing that both fat

and transgender plaintiffs share the frustration that anti-discrimination law sees them differently from
how these plaintiffs see themselves) [hereinafter, Glazer & Kramer, Trans Fat]; Elizabeth M. Glazer &
Zachary A. Kramer, The Awkward Phase ofAnti-DiscriminationLaw (in progress) (explaining that antidiscrimination law, as currently conceived, has failed to protect groups such as transgender, and bisexual
individuals, who fall outside of, in-between, or who are invisible to its spheres of protection) [hereinafter
Glazer & Kramer, The Awkward Phase].
19. See Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (holding that plaintiff was protected under Title VII for
being discriminated against because she was transgender).
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those extant identities. For instance, a religious convert has a transitional identity,
because her identity has aspects of the religion from which she is converting as
well as the religion to which she will convert. Similarly, a transgender person has a
transitional identity, because the person's identity has aspects of the gender or sex2"
from which the person is transitioning, as well as the gender or sex to which the
person will transition. An understanding of transgender identity as transitional may
strike some as controversial. In this Essay, we argue that such an understanding is
preferable-in that it provides a more stable foundation on which to fight the battle
against transgender discrimination-to the prevalent understanding of transgender
identity as gender nonconformity.
An overview of transgender discrimination cases in Section I demonstrates the
confused conception of transgender identity that has animated courts' decisions.
Section II describes what is meant by "transitional identity," and explains how an
understanding of transitional identity in anti-discrimination law benefits not only
transgender plaintiffs, but anti-discrimination law as a whole. Though the Schroer
court introduced the concept of transitional identity by analogy, this Essay hopes to
anchor that concept to a theory that is familiar to the anti-discrimination law
literature-intersectionality theory. Section III draws on intersectionality theory in
developing a theory of transitional discrimination, which is discrimination on the
basis of transitional identity. A brief conclusion summarizes the Essay's ideas.
I. TRANSGENDERISM IN TRANSITION: FROM ULANE TO SCHROER

As we have explained elsewhere, 2 we are witnessing an important moment in
the legal recognition of gender identity.22 For a long time, courts were quite
suspicious of discrimination claims brought by transgender employees.2 3 Indeed, it
was nearly impossible for transgender employees to bring actionable sex
discrimination claims because courts assumed that transgender individuals were
bringing sex discrimination claims as a means to bootstrap protection for gender
identity into Title VII.24 The prime example of this is the Seventh Circuit's
20. Because the definition of "transgender" used in this Essay includes those who transition
biologically as well as psychologically, an individual's transitional identity could borrow from both
sexes, if the individual transitions biologically, or from both genders, if the individual transitions
psychologically, or both.
21. See Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 205, 233-42 (2009)
(discussing the relationship between heterosexuality and Title VII and proposing a new approach for
courts in considering discrimination claims based in part on an individual's sexual orientation).
22. See Ilona M. Turner, Comment, Sex Stereotyping PerSe: TransgenderEmployees and Title VII,
95 CAL. L. REv. 561, 567-72, 577-84 (2007) (articulating the history of Title VII discrimination cases
involving transgender plaintiffs both leading up to and following Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989), and noting that the majority of the cases were decided in favor of the transgender plaintiffs).
23. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086-87 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding that
Title VII's prohibition against "sex" discrimination does not cover discrimination based on gender
identity); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (same); Kirkpatrick v.
Seligman & Latz, Inc., 636 F.3d 1047, 1050-51 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977) (same); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 403 F. Supp.
456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), af'd,570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978) (same).
24. See, e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085-87 (holding that Title VII's prohibition of discrimination
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25
decision Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., which was handed down in 1984. Yet
courts' attitude toward discrimination claims brought by transgender plaintiffs has
changed considerably since Ulane. In this Part, we trace the transformation of
26
courts' understanding of transgender identity from Ulane to Schroer v. Billington.
We demonstrate that courts' understanding of transgender identity has developed in
a rather confusing way. Because earlier cases of transgender discrimination were
decided in radically different ways, later courts have relied on an inconsistent
27
understanding of transgender identity when deciding cases. This Section lays the
foundation for the remainder of the Essay, where we argue that courts should
embrace an understanding of transgender identity as a transitional identity.

A. No Protectionfor Transsexuality
In Ulane, the plaintiff, a male-to-female transsexual, was fired from her job as
a pilot for Eastern Airlines after she returned to work following sex reassignment
surgery. 2s She brought a discrimination claim under Title VII based on her sex and
her transsexuality. 29 Though the trial court ruled in her favor, the appellate court
reversed, concluding that Title VII's prohibition against discrimination because of
30
sex does not encompass discrimination on the basis of transsexuality. Moreover,
against on the
the court also concluded that Karen Ulane was not discriminated
32
3
basis of her sex, ' thereby foreclosing relief under Title VII
B. Conflating Gender Nonconformity with TransgenderIdentity
Since Ulane, courts have begun to address transgender cases from a different
perspective. There is an emerging strand of case law that breaks from Ulane,
holding that transgender employees can bring actionable discrimination claims
because of sex does not protect against discrimination because of transsexuality).
25. 742 F.2d 1081.
26. 577 F. Supp. 2d 293.
27. Compare Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085-87 (holding that discrimination based on transsexuality is not
the same as discrimination "because of sex" and therefore is not prohibited under Title VII), with Maffei
v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 394-96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (specifically declining to
follow the Ulane court's reasoning and holding that a transsexual may state a sex discrimination claim
under Title VII).
28. Ulane, 742 F.2d. at 1082-83.
29. Id. at 1082.
30. Id. at 1085-87. According to the court, "Congress has a right to deliberate on whether it wants
such a broad sweeping of the untraditional and unusual within the term "sex" as used in Title VII. Only
Congress can consider all the ramifications to society of such a broad view .... If Congress believes
that transsexuals should enjoy the protection of Title VII, it may so provide. Until that time, however,
we decline on behalf of the Congress to judicially expand the definition of sex as used in Title VII
beyond its common and traditional interpretation." Id. at 1086.
31. Id. at 1087.
32. Commenting on Ulane, William Eskridge and Nan Hunter asked: "What could be a more logical
example of 'sex discrimination' than firing a pilot because her sex as presented is not the same as the
sex as the employer understood it?" They go on to suggest that: "This seems in many respects more of a
core sex discrimination than the firing of a female pilot because the employer thinks that women do not
fly as well as men." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE
LAW: TEACHER'S MANUAL 193 (2d ed., 2004) (on file with authors).
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under Title VII.3 3 The impetus for this change was the Supreme Court's decision in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,34 where the Court established the genderstereotyping theory of sex discrimination.3 5 In Price Waterhouse, the Court
expanded the reach of Title VII's sex discrimination jurisprudence by holding that
Title VII prohibits employment decisions based on an employee's failure to
conform to gender stereotypes.36 The case revolved around Ann Hopkins, who was
denied partnership at her consulting firm despite a strong work record. 37 In
rejecting Hopkins's candidacy, the partners expressed uneasiness about-and in
certain cases outright hostility toward-Hopkins's appearance and demeanor,
criticizing her for her lack of femininity. 8 The most egregious example was the
advice given to Hopkins so she could improve her chances for partnership in the
future: she was told to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."39
Ruling in favor of Hopkins, the Court developed a new theory of sex
discrimination, which has come to be known as the gender-stereotyping theory of
sex discrimination. 40 According to the Court, "we are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
stereotype associated with their group. '41 The thrust of the gender-stereotyping
theory is that employers violate Title VII when they base employment decisions on
an employee's failure to conform to stereotypical expectations of how men and
women are supposed to look and behave in the workplace. 42 Since Price
Waterhouse, courts have applied the gender-stereotyping theory in cases involving
43
lesbians and gay men.
After Price Waterhouse, transgender employees began basing their
discrimination claims not on their transgender status-a basis which had proved
unsuccessful in Ulane-but instead on their gender-nonconformity. Consider an
33. See, e.g., Smith, 378 F.3d at 572-73 (concluding that a transgender plaintiff can state an
actionable gender-stereotyping claim); Barnes, 401 F.3d at 737 (affirming Smith on the same grounds).
34. 490 U.S. 228.
35. Id. at 250-52.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 233-34.
38. Id. at 234-35.
39. Id. at 234 (quotations omitted).
40. See generally Zachary A. Kramer, Note, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing GenderConforming and Gender-Nonconforming Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 465 (2004)
(discussing the gender-stereotyping theory and applying it to cases involving lesbians and gay men).
41. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
42. Id. at 250-52. Under the gender-stereotyping theory, Price Waterhouse violated Title VII
because it discriminated against Hopkins for not appearing and acting feminine enough in the
workplace. As their advice showed, the partners expected Hopkins to dress and act femininely. Id. at
235. But because she was more masculine than feminine, she failed to conform to their sex-based
expectations, and they rejected her partnership bid because of it. Thus they acted on the basis of her sex
in violation of Title VII.
43. See, e.g., Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408-10 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that an
effeminate gay man could avail himself of the gender-stereotyping theory); Heller v. Columbia
Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1223-25 (D. Or. 2002) (holding that a masculine
lesbian woman could avail herself of the gender-stereotyping theory).
44. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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example of where a transgender plaintiff successfully employed this strategy.
Jimmie Smith was suspended from her45 job as a firefighter after she informed her
supervisors that she intended to transition from male to female.46 At the time of her
suspension, Smith was a lieutenant in the Salem Fire Department, in Salem, Ohio,
where she had worked for over seven years without any negative incidents.4 7 By
the time Smith decided to tell her supervisors about her situation, she was already
"expressing a more feminine appearance on a full-time basis," and her coworkers
48
had begun to ask questions and make comments about her changing appearance.
49
Shortly after this meeting, Smith's supervisors hatched a plan to get rid of her.
Instead of terminating her directly, the supervisors decided that Smith would have
to undergo three separate psychological evaluations.5 0 They hoped that Smith
would either refuse to follow the order or resign. 1 If she refused to comply with
the order, they planned to fire her for insubordination. 2 After hearing about the
department's plan, Smith hired a lawyer, who contacted the department to inform
them of Smith's legal representation. 3
Shortly thereafter, the department
4
Smith.1
suspended
Basing her claim on the gender-stereotyping theory that grew out of Price
Waterhouse, Smith brought a sex discrimination claim under Title VII. Smith
alleged that she was discriminated against for failing to conform to stereotypical
notions of how a man should look and act. In a break from a long line of cases
concluding that transgender plaintiffs cannot raise actionable sex discrimination
claims,55 the Smith court held that Smith's transgenderism did not prevent her from
raising an actionable claim. 6 According to the court, the analysis in these older
cases had been "eviscerated" by the Supreme Court's decision in Price
57
Waterhouse.
After Price Waterhouse, the Smith court reasoned, "employers who
discriminate against men because they ... wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise
act femininely are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the discrimination
would not occur but for the victim's sex." 58 And because Price Waterhouse did not

45. Though Jimmie Smith and her attorney decided to use male pronouns for Jimmie Smith
throughout the Smith litigation, we refer to Jimmie Smith in this Essay using female pronouns. Because
we urge courts to see transgender plaintiffs as they see themselves, we, along with our editors, feel that
this Essay should not be yet another forum in which Jimmie Smith must mask her identity in order to
obtain relief from discrimination suffered. Telephone Interview with Miranda Bemabei, Attorney for
Jimmie Smith, in Bedford, Ohio (Mar. 20, 2009).
46. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568-69.
47. Id. at 568.
48. Id. (quotations omitted).
49. Id.at 568-69.
50. Id.at 569.
51. Id.
52. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568-69.
53. Id.
54. Id.at 569.
55. See Bernabei, supra note 45.
56. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574-75.
57. Id.at 573.
58. Id.at 574.
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"provide any reason to exclude Title VII coverage for non sex-stereotypical
behavior simply because the person is transsexual,"59 a plaintiffs transgender
identity will not spoil the plaintiff's sex discrimination claim so long as the plaintiff
has suffered discrimination on the basis of a failure to conform to gender
stereotypes. 60 Thus, the Smith court concluded, "discrimination against a plaintiff
who is a transsexual-and therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or her
gender-is no different from the discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins in
'61
Price Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a woman.
Jimmie Smith is not alone. Since the Smith case was handed down, several
courts have adopted the approach taken by the Smith court, concluding that
transgender identity is not a bar to bringing an actionable sex discrimination
claim. 62 For instance, in Barnes v. Cincinnati,63 a case which came directly on the
heels of Smith, the Sixth Circuit ruled that Phelicia Barnes, a police officer in
Cincinnati, Ohio, could bring a gender-stereotyping claim against the police
department for failing to promote her to the rank of sergeant. 64 As in Smith, the
court in Barnes accepted the discrimination claim brought by a male-to-female
transsexual on the basis of Price Waterhouse gender-stereotyping.
C. Reviving Ulane?
In 2007, three years after Smith was decided, Krystal Etsitty, a pre-operative
male-to-female transsexual and former employee of Utah Transit Authority
("UTA"), brought an unsuccessful claim against UTA and her former supervisor
for discriminating against her in violation of Title VII's prohibition against sex
discrimination. 65 Etsitty worked for UTA as an extra-board operator, which meant
that she would fill in for regular operators who were on vacation or who had called
in sick. As a result of her position, Etsitty drove many of UTA's 115 to 130 bus
routes in the Salt Lake City area over a period of approximately ten weeks. UTA
employees used public restrooms while on their routes.6 6 According to Etsitty's
supervisor, the primary reason for her termination was Etsitty's intent to use
67
women's restrooms along her bus route.

59. Id. at 575.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Barnes, 401 F.3d at 736 (holding that the lower court did not err in instructing the jury
that it could find discrimination against a transsexual plaintiff based on sex-stereotyping); Schroer, 577
F. Supp. 2d at 308 (holding that plaintiff was protected under Title VII for being discriminated against
because she was transgender); Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d
653, 659-61 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (finding that a transgender employee does have a cause of action under
Title VII given that the plain language of Title VII and Price Waterhouse fail to distinguish between
transgender employees and a feminine male or a masculine female).
63. 401 F.3d 729.
64. ld. at 737.
65. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007).
66. Id. at 1219.
67. Brian P. McCarthy, Note, Trans Employees and PersonalAppearance Standards Under Title
VII, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 939, 949 (2008) (citing Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219).
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Etsitty argued that she was protected under Title VII because a person's
identity as a transsexual is directly connected to the sex organs she possesses,
meaning that discrimination against her because of her transsexuality was
discrimination against her because of sex.6" In rejecting Etsitty's claim, the Tenth
Circuit reiterated the holding of cases like Ulane-not Smith or Barnes-by
holding that transsexuals did not fall within Title VII's protective reach.6 9 As a
result, the Etsitty court held that Title VII did not protect transsexuals in general,
and did not protect Etsitty in particular.70 The court also rejected Etsitty's claim
that she was discriminated against because of her gender-nonconformity because it
concluded that "Etsitty ha[d] not presented a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether UTA's stated motivation for her termination [wa]s pretextual."'
D. The Schroer Decision and Its Significance
In light of conflicting decisions in Smith and Barnes on the one hand, and
Etsitty on the other, the Schroer court could have ruled in any number of ways. 2
As we have noted elsewhere, Schroer is "at once consistent and inconsistent with
the path laid out in Smith."73 Schroer is consistent with Smith because the court
concluded that Schroer, a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual, could raise an
actionable claim under Title VII. However, Schroer is inconsistent with Smith
because of the way the court in Schroer came to decide in Diane Schroer's favor.
In fact, while the outcome in Schroer is more consistent with the outcome in
Smith and Barnes, the reasoning in Schroer is-perhaps counterintuitively-more
consistent with the reasoning in Ulane and Etsitty. The Schroer court may have
shared the Smith and Barnes courts' thought that the plaintiff before the court
deserved Title VII's protection. However, the Schroer court shared both the Ulane
court's and the Etsitty court's thought that the plaintiff before the court had a
distinct transgender identity. Rather than require plaintiffs to cast themselves as
gender-nonconforming men or women, the courts in Ulane, Etsitty, and Schroer
saw these plaintiffs for who they were-transgender people. For all three courts,
protecting transgender discrimination would require broadening the scope of Title
VII's prohibition against discrimination "because of sex" to include
transgenderism. While only Schroer held that Title VII's prohibition could be read
so broadly, it is worth noting that all three cases shared the view that

68. Elsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1221-22.
71. Id. at 1224.
72. Compare Smith, 378 F.3d at 574-75 (holding that allegations of discrimination because of
plaintiffs gender-nonconforming behavior were actionable under Title VII), with Etsitty, 502 F.3d at
1221-22 (holding that allegations of discrimination because of plaintiffs transsexuality were not
actionable under Title VII as discrimination because of sex).
73. Kramer, supra note 21, at 241 (reasoning that Schroer is inconsistent with Smith because
Schroer held that a transgender employee could raise a discrimination claim under Title VII, but that
Schroer is inconsistent with Smith because Schroer held that the plaintiffs claim was actionable, not
because of her gender nonconformity, but because of her sex).
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transgenderism is a distinct identity, one that need not be grouped together with
gender-nonconformity.
In order to amplify its acceptance of transgender identity as a distinct identity,
the Schroer court offered an illuminating hypothetical:
Imagine that an employee is fired because she converts from
Christianity to Judaism. Imagine too that her employer testifies that
he harbors no bias toward either Christians or Jews but only
"converts." That would be a clear case of discrimination "because of
religion." No court would take seriously the notion that "converts"
are not covered by the statute. Discrimination "because of religion"
easily encompasses discrimination because of a change of religion.
But in cases where the plaintiff has changed her sex, and faces
discrimination because of the decision to stop presenting as a man
and to start appearing as a woman, courts have traditionally carved
such persons out of the statute by concluding that "transsexuality" is
unprotected by Title VII. In other words, courts have allowed their
focus on the 74
label "transsexual" to blind them to the statutory
language itself.

In the above passage, the Schroer court makes implicit reference to the courts
in Ulane and Etsitty, which have "traditionally carved [transgender or transsexual]
persons out of the statute by concluding that 'transsexuality' is unprotected by Title
VII." 75 However, in reaching the opposite conclusion from that reached in either
Ulane or Etsitty, the Schroer court joined these courts' conception of transgender
identity as a distinct identity.76 In protecting Diane Schroer from the discrimination
she suffered, the Schroer court argued that the "statutory language itself,"77 the
actual words of Title VII, encompassed her transgender identity.
II. TRANSITIONAL

IDENTITY

Transgender plaintiffs are winning discrimination cases.7 1 From the
perspective of transgender rights advocates, this is a good thing. In this Essay, we
do not mean to argue that the outcomes in cases like Smith and Barnes should
change. But we are concerned with the path taken by courts in reaching these
outcomes. Specifically, we take issue with the way in which courts conflate
gender-nonconformity and transgender identity. As we argue throughout this
paper, we believe that transgender rights should fall within the ambit of Title VII's
existing protection against sex discrimination.

74. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306-07 (emphasis in original).
75. Id. at 307.
76. See id. (noting that Ulane and Etsitty refused to extend protection to transgender employees
because Title VII was intended only to apply to the traditional applications of sex).
77. Id.
78. See supra notes 33-64 & 72-77 and accompanying text (briefly listing and discussing cases
where claims brought by transgender plaintiffs succeeded).
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The conflation of gender-nonconformity and transgender identity does not
offer transgender plaintiffs a stable basis upon which to bring claims of transgender
discrimination.7 9 In this Essay, we argue that incorporating an understanding of
transitional identity into anti-discrimination law will provide a firmer basis upon
which to bring claims of transgender discrimination. 0 This Section explains
transitional identity and situates it within the current conception of identity that
animates anti-discrimination law. This Section demonstrates that an understanding
of transitional identity benefits not only transgender plaintiffs and their advocates,
but also the overarching structure of anti-discrimination law.
A. Identity in Anti-discriminationLaw
Anti-discrimination law protects individuals through statutes like Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which protects employees from discrimination at work.8
If an individual believes he has suffered discrimination at work, in order to avail
himself of the protections offered against such discrimination by Title VII, the
individual must determine whether he fits within a category against which Title VII
prohibits discrimination."2 The categories protected by Title VII, according to the
statute's plain words, are "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."83 In order
to articulate a discrimination claim under Title VII, plaintiffs must satisfy the
statute's causation requirement, meaning that plaintiffs must claim that the
discrimination suffered was "because of' their membership in a particular protected
category. 84 For instance, "[i]n order to state an actionable sex discrimination claim,
a plaintiff must prove that she suffered unlawful discrimination 'because of' sex
and not 'because of some other characteristic that is not protected by Title VII,
such as eye color or whether she is a Chicago Cubs fan." 5
Of course, discrimination "because of' one's membership in a particular
category group against which Title VII prohibits discrimination can occur for a
number of different reasons. For instance, an employer might discriminate against
a black employee when deciding not to hire her or to fire her simply because the
employee is black. Or the employer might also discriminate against a black
employee when requiring that the employee stop wearing cornrows in her hair.86
Thus, discrimination in violation of Title VII can occur on the basis of either status
(i.e., the status of one's membership in a group represented by one of Title VII's

79. See discussion infra Section II.B-C.
80. See discussion infra Section IIIA-B.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 ("It shall be an unlawful practice for an employer ... to discriminate
against any individual.., because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.").
82. Id.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
84. See Kramer, supranote 21, at 212.
85. Id; see generally David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex: The Causation Problem in
Sexual HarassmentLaw, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1709-14 (2002) (discussing the requirement of sex as
a motivating factor in discrimination).
86. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, Il1 YALE L.J. 769, 779-80 (2002) (citing Rogers v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the
Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (1991)).
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protected categories) or conduct (i.e., the conduct one might display that is
constitutive of one's membership in a group represented by one of Title VII's
protected categories).87 As we have argued elsewhere, these two types of
discrimination-status and conduct discrimination-are often referred to as first
and second generation discrimination, respectively.88
Civil rights lawyers and scholars have, in large part, turned their attention
away from what is referred to as "first generation" discrimination. 9 In the "second
generation" of discrimination law, the "[s]moking guns - the sign on the door that
'Irish need not apply' or the rejection explained by the comment that 'this is no job
for a woman'- are largely things of the past." 90 The move from first to second
generation discrimination has been characterized as "'progress: individuals no
longer need[] to be white, male, straight, Protestant, and able-bodied; they need[]
only to act white, male, straight, Protestant, and able-bodied.' 91
The disaggregation of sex from gender, the awareness of demands
placed upon individuals who display traits that are constitutive of
their group identity to downplay or "cover" the adjectives that make
them the nouns that they are, and the trait discrimination movement
generally, have offered discrimination law great gains "in analytic
clarity and in human liberty and equality." 92
However, the pervasiveness of those gains has obscured a loss: the fact that
second generation discrimination harms are assessed by reference to the first
generation categories to which they respond. Combating discrimination on the
basis of conduct is a worthy enterprise, because an ideal body of antidiscrimination law would encourage individuals to be their most authentic selves. 93
But if the conduct to which attention is turned in the second generation of antidiscrimination law is only conduct that corresponds to categories of individuals
whose protection is codified in Title VII, some problems are likely to arise.
First, as Professor Russell Robinson has noted, refocusing anti-discrimination
law to battle the harms of its second generation, "which relies on individualized,
subjective definitions of 'authenticity' in order to avoid the charge of essentializing

87. Cf Elizabeth M. Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1379, 1419-32
(2008) (discussing homosexuality in terms of status discrimination and conduct discrimination).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1419. One scholar has notably termed status-based discrimination "ontological"
discrimination. See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination:An Argument
Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 170 n.15 (2004) (defining "ontological discrimination" as
"discrimination that is status-based in the most basic sense-all women or men are excluded because of
their status as such").
90. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459-60 (2001).
91. Glazer, supra note 87, at 1420 (quoting KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON
OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 22 (2006)).
92. Id.(internal citations omitted).
93. See YOSHINO, supra note 91, at 184-87 (discussing U.S. Supreme Court cases sympathetic to
authenticity and the authentic self).
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or stereotyping identity . . . risks reinscribing the very majority norms that
[proponents of a focus on second generation discrimination harms, like Yoshino]
In other words, a likely effect of battling conduct that is taken to be
oppose. . . ,,94
constitutive of group membership is the reinforcement of stereotypes that have
come to define members of particular groups.
Second, shifting the attention of anti-discrimination law away from its first
generation and toward its second generation suggests that the categories upon
which first generation discrimination occurs-namely, the categories upon which
discrimination is prohibited by statute9 5-are sufficient. After all, if second
generation discrimination harms are predicated upon the categories that the first
generation of anti-discrimination law protects, an exclusive focus on conduct
discrimination may substitute the equally worthy enterprise of criticizing the
institution of the categories themselves. A growing community of scholars has
begun to engage in the project of criticizing anti-discrimination law's categories.96
These scholars have started to ask not how plaintiffs can fit into the current
categories but instead how anti-discrimination law may make room within its
protective ambit for plaintiffs-like fat, transgender, and bisexual plaintiffs-who
cannot fit into the molds that current categories offer. 97 A fuller exploration of this
group of awkwardly situated plaintiffs is outside the scope of this Essay, and is the
subject of a sister project of ours. 98 For now, we wish simply to make the point that
the progression of anti-discrimination law from its first to its second generation has
caused some scholars to re-examine the categorical structure upon which this
progression is based.
B. TransitionalIdentity Defined
A critic of anti-discrimination law's categorical structure could approach her
criticism from a variety of angles. For instance, she might argue that the categories
are insufficient because there are too few of them.99 Alternatively, she might argue
94. Russell K. Robinson, Uncovering Covering, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1809, 1815 (2007) (reviewing
YOSHINO, supra note 91).
95. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanics of Title VII, including
those protected classes covered by the statute).
96. See, e.g., DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DIsCRIMINATION WRONG? 7-9 (2008) (arguing that
discrimination, broadly defined, is wrong when it demeans the individuals it affects); KIRKLAND, supra
note 18, at 53-54 (determining which differences matter and which do not, for the purposes of antidiscrimination law, by examining "logics of personhood" rather than categories and applying those
logics to the liminal category of fatness); E. Christi Cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: The
Myth of the ProtectedClass in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REv. 441, 500 (1998)
(advocating a paradigm of wholism (and not one of intersectionality), because the author argues that
"[g]roup definition or group confinement is the essence of discrimination"); Kathleen E. Mahoney, Hate
Speech: Affirmation or Contradictionof Freedom of Expression, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 789, 801 (1996)
(explaining that the "essence of discrimination ...is not just how members of disadvantaged minorities
feel about themselves; it is also how they are viewed by members of the dominant majority").
97. See supranote 18 and accompanying text.
98. See Glazer & Kramer, The Awkward Phase, supranote 18.
99. This would be one way to read Professor Anna Kirkland's critique in Fat Rights. In her book,
Professor Kirkland at once criticizes anti-discrimination law's categorical structure and proposes the
addition of "fatness" to its list of protected categories. For further elaboration of this point, see Glazer &
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that one or more of the categories that anti-discrimination law protects are not the
correct categories. A third option might be for her to argue that the currently
protected categories are not being used properly. It is this third option that most
accurately characterizes our critique of anti-discrimination law, as well as its
particular conception of transgender identity. In order to articulate our critique, we
introduce the concept of transitional identity.
Simply put, transitional identity is identity in transition. The religious convert
whom the Schroer court referenced has a transitional identity. 00 The convert's
identity has aspects of the religion from which she is converting as well as the
religion to which she will convert.'
Diane Schroer also has a transitional identity.
For that matter, so do Karen Ulane, Jimmie Smith, and Krystal Etsitty. 0 A
transgender person has a transitional identity because the person's identity has
aspects of the gender or sex from which the person is transitioning as well as the
gender or sex to which the person will transition. Transitional identity is identity
that has aspects of one or more extant identities, but which is inchoate, in that the
identity does not express fully any of those extant identities.
The incorporation of transitional identity into anti-discrimination law may
strike some as controversial. Not all religious converts identify as converts, but
may instead wish to assimilate into the religion to which they have converted.0 3
Not all transgender individuals identify as transgender, but may instead wish to
assimilate into what will become their surviving gender or sex. 104 This is a point
we take especially seriously because we argue in other work that the purpose of
anti-discrimination is to see plaintiffs asserting discrimination claims in the way
those plaintiffs see themselves.0 5 However, we contend that an understanding of
transgender identity as transitional is preferable to the prevalent understanding of
transgender identity as gender nonconformity for two reasons. First, such an
understanding specifically addresses the transitional aspect of transgenderism.
Second, our proposal that anti-discrimination law adopt an understanding of
transitional identity does not preclude a gender-nonconforming transgender person
from claiming that she was discriminated against as a result of her gender-

Kramer, Trans Fat,supra note 18.
100. See Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306-07 (comparing the transition of a transgender person to the
transition experienced by a religious convert).
101. See id. (noting that an individual in the midst of a religious conversion would be protected under
Title VII).
102. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 567 (bringing a sex discrimination claim as a self-identified transsexual
plaintiff); Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082 (bringing separate sex discrimination claims as a transsexual and as a
female); Schroer, 502 F.3d at 1218 (bringing the claim as a self-identified "pre-operative transgendered
individual").
103. Cf Etsitty, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306-07 (discussing how courts would not treat religious converts
differently from those "born" into their religion).
104. Cf id. (drawing a parallel between transsexuality and how the law would not differentiate
between religious converts and those "born" into their religion). The "surviving" gender or sex means
the gender or sex into which the individual ultimately assimilates, if any. In this way the word
"surviving" is used in the way that the term is often used in the corporate mergers and acquisitions
context, where an entity into which another entity has merged survives the merger.
105. See Glazer & Kramer, Trans Fat,supranote 18.
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nonconformity. Transitional identity is meant to open up, not to close off, avenues
of available relief for discrimination's victims.
C. The Invisibility of TransitionalIdentity in Anti-discriminationLaw
An advocate for transgender rights may hail Jimmie Smith's case as a
watershed moment for the transgender rights movement. We think this is a
shortsighted view of the Smith case and its progeny. In this Section we criticize the
Smith court's analysis, focusing on the way the court understands Smith's sex and
gender identity. Specifically, we argue that the court's analysis, while seemingly
progressive on its face, is potentially harmful to Smith-and by extension, all
transgender plaintiffs-because of its reductionist approach to Smith's identity. A
better approach to the case, we argue, would have incorporated the concept of
transitional identity.
As it has developed, the gender-stereotyping theory used in cases like Smith
06
Of
and Barnes has adopted a fairly rigid approach to a plaintiffs sex and gender.
course, by "sex" we refer to biological differences, while we understand "gender"
107
The genderin terms of cultural roles, such as femininity and masculinity.
stereotyping theory unfolds in three steps. The starting point is to determine the
plaintiffs "anchor gender," that is, the gender commonly associated with a
person's sex. 108 The anchor gender for men is masculinity, while femininity is the
anchor gender for women.0 9 The second step is to determine a plaintiff's
"expressive gender," that is, the plaintiff's particular gender expression."' For Ann
Hopkins, the plaintiff around whom the gender-stereotyping theory was built, her
expressive gender was masculinity, as her coworkers perceived her as excessively
masculine in terms of her personal appearance and behavior."' The third and final
step of the theory is to compare the plaintiffs anchor and expressive genders."' If
the employer acted because these genders do not correspond, then the plaintiff has
suffered discrimination on the basis of his or her failure to conform to stereotypical
notions of gender. '3

This theory is problematic for someone in Jimmie Smith's position because
Smith's sex and gender are not stable identities. Indeed, the gender-stereotyping
theory presupposes that a person's sex and gender are fixed traits. But at the time
of her case, Smith's sex and gender were quite literally in a state of transition.

106. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregationof Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1995) (criticizing sex discrimination
law for assuming that male and female identities are different from masculine and feminine identities).
107. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructingthe Conflation of
"Sex, " "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1,
20-27 (1995) (discussing "(mis)understandings of the use of equating sex with gender").
108. See Kramer, supranote 40, at 484.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 484-85.
111. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (noting that coworkers found Hopkins to be "macho"
and described her as "a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed" manager).
112. See Kramer, supranote 40, at 485.
113. Id. at 485-86.
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Born biologically male, Smith had begun the process of transitioning to female."14
And as a part of that process, Smith began expressing a more feminine gender
expression in her daily life." 5 But how do we determine what Smith's sex is?
Although she was born male, Smith never really felt like a man, identifying more
as a woman trapped in a man's body. And what is Smith's gender? The answers to
these questions are elusive. In the case, the court takes the path of least resistance.
It concludes that because Smith was a man who wanted to wear women's clothing,
her anchor gender was masculinity and her expressive gender was femininity." 6
Thus Smith's case was an easy one for the court.
Our difficulty with the Smith case is that the court reduces Smith's transgender
identity to little more than a fashion choice to wear women's clothing. Under the
court's approach, Smith's reasons for wanting to change her appearance in the
workplace simply did not matter; the only thing that did matter for the court's
theory to work is that Smith wanted to dress and behave in a way that is
incompatible with stereotypical expectations of masculinity. Professor Anna
Kirkland stated the issue well in her book, Fat Rights, noting that, "Transsexuals or
transgender people per se do not really exist in the Smith opinion; there just happen
to be some men out there who want to wear dresses."'" 7 Moreover, in an earlier
article on the topic, Kirkland elaborated that
the real problem [which the Smith case goes out of its way to avoid]
...is that nontrans people find [trans] people threatening, horrifying,
aesthetically shocking, and deviant. An employer fires a trans
person as a trans person, not as a man who wants to wear women's
clothing." 8
Because, as we argue elsewhere, we favor a system of anti-discrimination laws in
which the plaintiff's sense of herself rather than the defendant's perception of her
forms the basis for an actionable discrimination claim, it matters very little to us
why individuals discriminate against transgender people." 9 However, in Smith and
other cases involving discrimination against transgender plaintiffs, the transgender
identity that these plaintiffs have tried to assert has been ignored entirely by courts.
Our claim is that anti-discrimination law cannot offer meaningful relief to
transgender individuals without recognizing the core of their identity. After all,
transgenderism is not a fashion choice. Even though transgender people must make
complicated decisions about how they will present themselves to the world, their

114. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568.
115. Id.
116. Id.
at 574-75.
117, KIRKLAND, supra note 18, at 86; see also Anna Kirkland, What's at Stake in Transgender
Discriminationas Sex Discrimination?,32 SIGNS 83, 94-95 (2006) ("The [Smith] case reduces the story
of gender oppression to a story about stereotypes and makes MTFs into men who wear dresses and
makeup.").

118. Kirkland, supranote 117, at 108.
119. See Glazer & Kramer, Trans Fat, supranote 18.
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identities cannot be reduced to a man's decision to wear a dress or a woman's
decision to wear a tuxedo.
There is no doubt that a plaintiff like Jimmie Smith is in an awkward position.
At the heart of Smith's case-indeed, the genesis of her case-was her desire to
120
Another way of
have her employer's support as she transitioned on the job.
thinking about the case is that Smith wanted the fire department to make an
accommodation so that she could begin to assert a female identity in the workplace.
Yet the gender-stereotyping theory, as endorsed by the court, effectively strips
Smith of her transgender identity. In order to state an actionable claim, Smith must
transform herself into a man who just wants to wear women's clothing.
Smith's transgenderism is not a label for gender-nonconforming behavior. It
is an identity that Smith is affirmatively claiming. It is her sense of self. The
court's causation analysis is only concerned with what Smith's supervisors
2
perceived about Smith, not what Smith perceived about herself. ' From the
supervisor's perspective, a male employee had informed an employer that "he"
planned to dress like a female employee at work. But this is quite different from
how Smith perceived this exchange. From Smith's perspective, she was informing
her supervisors about a fundamental change going on in her life, which was an
essential part of who she was and how she saw herself. However, the Smith court's
interpretation of anti-discrimination law did not have a mechanism to see Smith as
a transgender person. By contrast, the concept of transitional identity allows future
courts to see transgender people for who they are-transgender people.
III.

TRANSITIONING TowARD TRANSITIONAL IDENTITY

In order to begin to sort out the confusion generated by the current body of
transgender discrimination cases,' 22 and in order to resolve the problems generated
23
by the rigidity of anti-discrimination law's categories, courts must have available
to them a stable theory through which to understand transgender identity. A stable
theory of transgender identity must take into account the transitional reality of
transgender identity. By drawing on intersectionality theory, which has hugely
influenced anti-discrimination law in the recent past, this Section introduces a
theory of discrimination on the basis of transgender identity: transitional
discrimination.
A. IntersectionalityTheory
The introduction of the theory of intersectionality, "an important elaboration
of the relationship between law and identity that emerged in legal scholarship in the

120. Cf.Smith, 378 F.3d at 568 (discussing how Smith "approached [her supervisor] in order to
answer any questions (he] might have concerning [Smith's] appearance and manner" thereby gaining

support from her coworkers).
121. See, e.g., Smith, 378 F.3d at 572 (focusing on Smith's coworker's belief that Smith's dress and
mannerisms were not masculine enough).
122. See supra Section I.
123. See supra Section II.
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early 1990's,"24 revolutionized anti-discrimination law. 25
Whereas antidiscrimination law traditionally referenced a single basis upon which a plaintiff
articulated a discrimination claim, the introduction of the idea of intersectionalitynamely, that individuals could fit into more than one of anti-discrimination law's
protected categories--opened the door for intercategorical discrimination claims.
In anti-discrimination law, an intersectional claim (or, a claim for intercategorical
discrimination) is one that is based on at least two or more overlapping identity
traits.'26
An example of an intersectional claim that we have referenced in other work is
a claim where gender-nonconformity and sexual orientation discrimination
collide.'27 For instance, Dawn Dawson, a gender-nonconforming lesbian, brought a
claim against her employer for discriminating against her because of her gendernonconformity.' 28 In rejecting her claim, the Second Circuit held that Dawson was
discriminated against not because of her gender-nonconformity but because of her
sexual orientation. 29 Further, because sexual orientation is not a protected trait
under Title VII, the court held that Dawson failed to state an actionable
discrimination claim. 30 According to the court, Dawson's sexual orientation was
so integral to her gender-stereotyping claim that the former effectively
overwhelmed the latter.' 3' Thus, Dawson's ultimately unsuccessful claim against
her employer for discrimination rested on an intersection of her gendernonconformity and her sexual orientation.
However, not all intersectional claims are unsuccessful. In fact, the reason
that Dawn Dawson's claim was unsuccessful was unique to the sexual orientation
discrimination context. In that context, courts have had a tendency to stop what
courts perceive as "bootstrapping" efforts on the part of homosexual plaintiffs to
124. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Intersectionality in Theory and Practice, in INTERSECTIONALITY AND
BEYOND: LAW, POWER AND THE POLITICS OF LOCATION 124 (Emily Grabham ct. al. eds., 2009).

125. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, II J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
701, 704-14 (2001) (noting that Kimberld Crenshaw's scholarship "remains the preeminent scholarship"
in the area of intersectionality); see also Kimberld Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti-discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 150 (1989) (arguing that courts, civil rights thinkers, and feminists
have as yet been "[u]nable to grasp the importance of Black women's intersectional experiences" and
the Black woman's "compounded nature of... experience is absorbed into the collective experience of
either" Blacks or women); see Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality Identity
Politicsand Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242-43 (1991) (discussing how
"[c]ontemporary feminist and antiracist discourses have failed to consider intersectional identities such
as women of color").
126. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 125, at 704-05; Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as
"Catch 22 ": Why Identity Performance Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L.
REV. 299, 301-04, 328-33 (2005).
127. See Kramer, supra note 21, at 218-19.
128. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Dawson 11];
Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 246 F. Supp. 2d 301, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
129. Dawson 11, 398 F.3d at 217-18.
130. Id.("Thus, to the extent that she is alleging discrimination based upon her lesbianism, Dawson
cannot satisfy the first element of a prima facie case under Title VII because the statute does not
recognize homosexuals as a protected class.").
131. Id.at 217-21.
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frame discrimination targeted at their sexual orientation as a claim of
32
Though courts have not
discrimination based on their gender-nonconformity.
some courts have been
have,
scholars
as
as
much
theory
embraced intersectionality
instance, consider the
For
claims.
discrimination
intersectional
receptive to some
woman.'33 Lam, a
American
Asian
an
Lam,
Maivan
by
discrimination experienced
law professor at the University of Hawaii's Richardson School of Law, applied
twice for the position of Director of the Law School's Pacific Asian Legal Studies
Program. 13 4 Despite a solid publication record and a record of experiences relevant
35
Even if
to her desired position, she was not offered the directorship position.'
women,
white
and
men
American
Asian
toward
hostile
not
were
Lam's employer
the employer may still harbor negative stereotypes about Asian American women
in particular.'36 The Lam court' 37 spoke specifically on this point, chastising the
court below that had erred by treating separately Lam's claims of race and sex
The Lam court went on to point out that other courts had
discrimination. 3
two bases for discrimination exist, they cannot be neatly
"where
that
recognized
39
When identity traits are combined, as they
components."'
distinct
to
reduced
to determine whether the employer
necessary
is
"it
case,
Lam's
Maivan
in
were
of factors, not just whether it
combination
that
of
basis
the
on
discriminates
the same sex."'140
of
or
race
same
of
that
people
against
discriminates
Intersectionality theory, while very influential to the evolution of anti4
discrimination law, finds itself in a "pivotal moment.' ' First, for a variety of
reasons, the theory has not been embraced by courts as enthusiastically as it has
been embraced by scholars. 142 Discrimination claims involve the determination of
whether a particular individual was treated differently because of a particular trait.
If a particular individual claims to have been treated differently because of the
combination of two, or even three or four traits, courts would need to isolate more
than a single variable differentiating the individual from similarly situated peers.
Courts have resisted conducting such multiple determinations, perhaps because the
introduction of multiple variables confounds the calculation of whether a particular
individual was treated differently because of a particular trait. After all, it is harder
132. See Kramer, supra note 21, at 219-20.
133. See, e.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing district court's
award of summary judgment to defendant acknowledging that Lam as an "Asian wom[a]n [was] subject
to a set of stereotypes and assumptions shared neither by Asian men nor by white women").
134. Id. at 1554.
135. Id. at 1556-57.
136. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 125, at 709 (discussing the example of discrimination aimed
at an Asian American woman).
137. 40F.3d 1551.
138. See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1561-62 (commenting that the district court "misconceived important legal
principles").
139. Id.at 1562 (citing Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032-34 (5th
Cir. 1980); Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Chambers v. Omaha
Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 946 n.34 (D. Neb. 1986), aff'd, 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987)).
140. Lam, 40 F.3d at 1562.
141. Goldberg, supranote 124, at 124.
142. See Suzanne Goldberg, CategoricalInstability: Identity-Based Discriminationand the Barriers
to Complexity (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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for a court to know whether a black woman was treated differently because she was
black, because she was a woman, or because she was both black and a woman.
Moreover, it is difficult for a court to know whether the discrimination claim
brought by a black woman entitles her to relief against her employer because the
court would need to determine whether she was treated differently because of her
race and because of her sex. However, because transitional discrimination applies
intersectionality theory to one particular trait, courts might not resist its application
in this context, because this context does not generate the same "confounding
variables" problem that an intercategorical application does. Moreover, perhaps
courts will more readily conduct intersectional analyses in other contexts once they
have become comfortable with its application in the transitional discrimination
context.
A second reason that intersectionality theory finds itself in a pivotal moment is
that the theory has been criticized by a number of scholars. For example, Professor
Nancy Levit has criticized the theory for its "false coherence - ignoring the
differences within identity categories that constitute the true variety of human
experiences.' ' 43 Professor Nancy Ehrenreich has built upon this criticism by
describing what she calls intersectionality theory's "infinite regress problem: the
tendency of all identity groups to split into ever-smaller subgroups, until there
seems to be no hope of any coherent category other than the individual."' 44
Addressing the validity of criticisms waged against intersectionality theory is
beyond the scope of this Essay. However, another benefit of the theory of
transitional discrimination is that it may strengthen intersectionality theory in the
eyes of its critics.
B. TransitionalDiscrimination
In order to remedy the confused state of the law regarding transgender
discrimination, this Essay has proposed a theory of transitional identity. 45
Discrimination on the basis of transitional identity is transitional discrimination. In
order to articulate a cause of action for transitional discrimination, a plaintiff would
need to follow similar steps to those a plaintiff would need to follow in stating any
claim for discrimination. Thus, a plaintiff would need to determine whether the
identities that make up his transitional identity constitute protected categories for
the purposes of anti-discrimination law. A religious convert would determine that
both Christianity, the religion from which he is converting, and Judaism, the
religion to which he is converting, are both religions. Because religion is a
protected category under Title VII, the discrimination experienced by the religious
convert at the hands of his employer constitutes discrimination in violation of Title
VII.
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Sorinc, 2009]

TRA4NSITIONAL DISCRIMINATION

Similarly, a female-to-male transgender individual would determine that both
being female, the sex from which the individual is transitioning, and being male,
the sex to which the individual is transitioning, are both sexes. And because sex is a
protected category under Title VII, the discrimination experienced by the
transgender individual at the hands of the individual's employer constitutes
discrimination in violation of Title VII.
In articulating a claim for transitional discrimination, a plaintiff who identifies
transitionally finds himself in a position similar to that of a plaintiff who
experiences discrimination on the basis of identifying with a combination of
protected categories. In this way, transitional discrimination works similarly to
intersectional discrimination. The difference between intersectional discrimination
and transitional discrimination, of course, is that the former represents
intercategorical discrimination while the latter represents intracategorical
discrimination.
The application of intersectional discrimination claims intracategorically
would seem to pose even less of a problem than their traditional intercategorical
application. Intracategorical claims-that is, transitional discrimination claimsseem to possess at least three clear advantages over their traditional intercategorical
counterparts. First, applying intersectional discrimination claims within categories
would seem to appease commentators who have criticized anti-discrimination law
for the rigidity of its categorical structure.1 46 Second, and related, intracategorical
discrimination claims would seem to appease commentators who have criticized
147
Third,
intersectionality theory for its predication upon rigid identity categories.
applying intersectionality theory intracategorically would remove the "confounding
variables" problem8 that has arguably deterred courts from applying the theory
14
intercategorically.
Anti-discrimination law is currently equipped to provide transgender plaintiffs
with a stable basis upon which to assert their identity. Whatever the benefits are to
anti-discrimination law or theory as a whole, the principal advantage of a cause of
action for transitional discrimination is the possibility it makes available for
As victims of
transgender plaintiffs to assert their transitional identity.
discrimination began to transcend categories by occupying more than one of them,
the law responded by offering to these plaintiffs relief from their intersectional
discrimination. As victims of discrimination begin to transcend categories by
falling in-between their parameters like transgender individuals do, the law must
respond by offering to these plaintiffs relief from their transitional discrimination.
CONCLUSION

Transgender individuals are sometimes men in dresses. They are sometimes
women in tuxedoes. They are sometimes men who used to be women and are
sometimes women who used to be men. They are sometimes men, and they are
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sometimes women. As much as identity itself is textured, so is transgender
identity. In order to preserve for transgender individuals the right not to be
discriminated against for being transgender, anti-discrimination law is in need of a
more stable theory of transgender identity than the prevailing gendernonconforming theory. This Essay has introduced a unique application of
intersectionality theory, already familiar in anti-discrimination circles, to
transgender identity. Intersectionality theory has broadened the scope of antidiscrimination law, by urging courts and commentators to take seriously
intercategorical discrimination.
The theory of transitional discrimination
introduced in this Essay urges courts and commentators to take seriously
intracategorical discrimination, as well.

